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REFRAMING THE CONFIRMATION DEBATE
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court is home to nine Justices. Over the past one hundred
and fifty years, there has been no variation in this number, except due to
vacancies caused by death or retirement. Therefore, people have had little
reason to believe that there is any flexibility in this arrangement. But nothing
in the Constitution fixes the Supreme Court at this size. In fact, the size was
set to seven Justices in 1866.1 It was placed at ten in 1863.2 Thus, the number
of seats can be quite malleable.3 It was not until 1869 that Congress set the
size to the nine seats that we are accustomed to today.4
During the recent Supreme Court vacancy—caused by the death of
Justice Antonin Scalia—and the ensuing unwillingness of the Senate to hold
confirmation hearings, the issue of the Supreme Court’s size, and the duties
(if any) of the other branches of the federal government to maintain its size,
have come under intense scrutiny. The role of partisan politics in the Senate’s
seemingly intransigent position not to hold confirmation hearings during the
remainder of President Obama’s presidency exacerbates this public debate.
This Essay seeks to reframe the current debate from whether or not the
Senate should be obligated to hold confirmation hearings without delay to why
immediate confirmation hearings are so important for some and such an
† Ph.D. Candidate in Law and Political Science, University of Southern California; Postdoctoral
Fellow in the Empirical Study of Public Law, Columbia University Law School. I would like to
thank Eric Segall for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Essay.
1 Judicial Circuits Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 209.
2 Tenth Circuit Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 794.
3 See generally, e.g., William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Court-Packing”
Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347 (detailing the history behind President Roosevelt’s efforts to increase
the size of the Supreme Court beyond nine Justices).
4 Circuit Judges Act of 1869, 16 Stat. 44.
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anathema to others. It does so by looking at how a Supreme Court of nine helps
the Court fulfill its constitutional duties while also considering how nine
Justices may actually thwart the Court’s objectives. This Essay proceeds by
examining how ideological polarization among the Justices, and not the
Court’s size, is the source of current (and past) tension. It also examines how
the orientation and effect of the current polarization are antithetical to a
well–functioning Supreme Court.
I. WHY NINE?
Article III of the United States Constitution vests the judicial power “in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.”5 It also lays the groundwork for the
situations that warrant federal court review.6 The Constitution, however, says
nothing about the goals of Supreme Court adjudication.
To locate the foundation undergirding these goals in early American history,
we can turn to Federalist Number 78. There, Alexander Hamilton explained:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.
A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental
law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning
of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body.7

The Court’s role in constitutional and statutory interpretation was of such
importance to the Framers that they introduced specific safeguards into
federal judgeships, such as life tenure and a guaranteed salary,8 to assure that
the Justices’ decisions would not easily be swayed by extrinsic forces.
Accordingly, Hamilton wrote:
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and
of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice,
can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a
temporary commission.9

From these statements and not from the Constitution itself, the original
purpose behind the Supreme Court is set forth: maintaining the letter of the
law in accordance with the Constitution.
5
6
7
8

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
See id. § 2 (providing the cases and controversies to which “[t]he judicial Power shall extend”).
THE F EDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that federal judges “shall hold their Offices during
good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office”).
9 THE F EDERALIST NO. 78, at 470-71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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The goal of the Court is also conveyed in some of its most well-known
cases.10 Some of these historic precedents were laid down by non-nine-member
Courts. The Marshall Court that decided Marbury v. Madison, for instance,
was composed of only six Justices.11
The public dilemma regarding the size of the Court was not present in the
nation’s early history. Part of the reason for this had to do with the size of the
Court evolving with the country’s needs—the size of the early Supreme Court
mimicked the number of geographic judicial circuits, so that each circuit would
have its own judicial representatives.12 Intra–Court ideological friction had yet
to insinuate itself into the public discourse surrounding the Court, and the rule
of law was at least publicly seen as the guidepost of jurisprudence.13 Whether
this was an accurate precept or not, there was little to challenge the sensibility
that the decisions of the Supreme Court were steeped predominately in legal
interpretation. But ideology soon became associated with legal
decisionmaking. Professor Llewellyn, for instance, observed that the ideology
of capitalism dictated American law in the early twentieth century.14 Not long
after, C. Herman Pritchett differentiated Supreme Court Justices’ preferences
along the liberal–conservative ideological continuum.15
The key point identified by judicial scholars—even by the mid-twentieth
century—was that Supreme Court Justices’ views accorded with those of the
political elites.16 Scholars realized that appointing Presidents and incumbent
Congresses had strong influences on Supreme Court Justices’ decisionmaking.17

10 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); see also United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (noting that “[m]any decisions of [the] Court . . . have unequivocally
reaffirmed the holding of Marbury . . . that ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is’” (fifth alteration in original)).
11 The members of this Court included Chief Justice Marshall and Justices Cushing, Paterson,
Chase, Washington, and Moore.
12 See Sandra Day O’Connor, Foreword, The Changing Role of the Circuit Justice, 17 U. TOL. L.
REV. 521, 521-23 (1986) (detailing the history of Supreme Court Justices riding circuit).
13 Roscoe Pound, Theories of Law, 22 YALE L.J. 114, 126 (1912) (“[T]he obligation of a rule of
law and the obligation of a moral rule, in this view, are essentially the same. In each case there is an
obligation resting upon reason, in that reason shows us the dictates of right and justice.”).
14 See K.N. Llewellyn, On Philosophy in American Law, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 205, 207-08 (1934)
(arguing that “the Business Man took hold of the ideology of America,” and it was this ideology that
“underlay the private law between 1870 and, say, 1900”).
15 See generally C. Herman Pritchett, Justice Holmes and a Liberal Court, 24 VA. Q. REV. 43 (1948).
16 See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 294 (1957) (describing how the views of the Supreme Court Justices
almost always align with those of the “dominant [national] alliance”).
17 See Lee Epstein & Eric A. Posner, Supreme Court Justices’ Loyalty to the President 26 (December
10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2702144 [https://perma.cc/6V9Y-JKHR]
(concluding that “Justices are more like[ly] to vote in favor of the government of the president who appointed
them than later governments, even after controlling for ideological and other relevant factors”).
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Although the Supreme Court might have survived with an even number
of Justices if the Justices were not clearly politically motivated, an even
number of Justices is not tenable on a Court influenced by political
preferences.18 How could the Supreme Court come to any conclusion on
impactful, substantive issues when the Justices are evenly divided between
political viewpoints?
II. PROBLEMS WITH EIGHT, PROBLEMS WITH NINE
Was the solution to a divided Court an odd number of Justices? Although
Supreme Court Justices have policy preferences, they are not so obtuse as to
flout them in the public domain. Strategic judicial theory helps to fill this
void by providing an explanation for how preferences balance out with tactical
decisionmaking.19
While an odd number of Justices puts a clear stopgap on indecision, it also
puts a premium on the tie-breaking vote. Although decisive outcomes became
inevitable with an odd number of Justices, the power of the tie-breaking vote
did not immediately become an object of inquiry. The idea of the median
Justice as a powerful member of the Court became a focal topic of discussion
many years after the decision to set the Supreme Court’s size at nine
Justices.20 Although a Court evenly divided across the ideological spectrum
creates an obvious concern of stalemates, an odd number of Justices will not
detract from the effect of ideology on the Justices’ decisions and may merely
enhance the median Justice’s power (which does not exist on an eight-member
Court) to decide cases based on ideological preferences.
There is vast power in a tie-breaking vote, especially when the vote favors
one political direction or the other. A balance of Justices on the liberal side of
the ideological spectrum helped the Warren Court to reach groundbreaking
decisions, from deconstructing the doctrine of separate but equal,21 to
providing increased procedural rights to the criminally accused.22 The shift

18 Cf. Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science
Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1186 (2004)
(describing “the Court’s often confounding ideological equipoise on many issues”).
19 See Samuel Krislov, Theoretical Attempts at Predicting Judicial Behavior, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1573,
1577-78 (1966) (describing the application of game theoretic models to the study of judicial behavior
to better understand the judicial bargaining process).
20 See Glendon Schubert, Judicial Attitudes and Voting Behavior: The 1961 Term of the United States
Supreme Court, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., WINTER 1963, at 100, 140 (1963) (factoring the
median Justice into decision-related calculations).
21 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that “[s]eparate educational
facilities are inherently unequal”).
22 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding, 5–4, that “the prosecution
[in a criminal case] may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
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in the Court’s ideological and partisan balance under Chief Justice Burger and
later under Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts led to retreats from the
doctrines laid down by the Warren Court.23
From the Warren Court on, the perceived political preferences of the
Justices highly correlated with their voting patterns.24 The ideological median
of the Court became identified as the Justice with the most decisionmaking
power.25 With all of the rhetoric and scholarship that has tracked the political
balance of the Court over the past half-century or more, there is a general
silence about its role in the current confirmation crisis.
With an even number of Justices, divided along the ideological spectrum,
the Court has been unable to decide on three of the most controversial cases
of the 2015 Supreme Court Term. In a sense, the Court has been unable to
fulfill its duty to interpret the Constitution and clarify the law according to
constitutional strictures for the rest of the country.
In Zubik v. Burwell, the Court was asked to review challenges to the
Affordable Care Act, based on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.26
Even with a prior ruling upholding corporate religious rights to bypass
certain healthcare guarantees under the Act in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores27—which was decided when Justice Scalia was still alive, a Court
composed of eight Justices in Zubik was unable to reach a decision and instead
remanded the case to the lower courts for further review.28
In a second case with implications for a large swath of the country’s
population, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, the Court divided evenly on
the question of whether non-union employees could opt out of paying public
union dues if they are based on agency shop arrangements.29 The Court, with
only eight Justices, again failed to reach a conclusion.
Finally, in a third case with far-reaching implications, the Justices were
evenly deadlocked on reaching a decision in United States v. Texas.30 As a result
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination”).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-25 (1984) (establishing a good faith
exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).
24 See Epstein & Posner, supra note 17, at 2 (noting that “numerous studies have established
that Supreme Court justices engage in ideological voting”).
25 See Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy: The Highly Influential Man in the Middle, WASH. POST (May
13, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/12/AR2007051201586.html
[https://perma.cc/DN45-DSS3] (noting that “[b]ecause the court so far has shown itself to be strikingly—and
evenly—divided on ideological issues, Kennedy holds enormous power in pivoting between the left and
right . . . . He stands alone in the middle—and that enhances his importance.”).
26 135 S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016) (per curiam).
27 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
28 Zubik, 135 S. Ct. at 1560.
29 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.).
30 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (mem.).
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of their indecision, the lower court’s opinion denying President Obama’s
amnesty plan for certain immigrant aliens was upheld.31 In all of these
decisions, there is no stare decisis laid down for lower courts to follow. While
it is unlikely that the Court would remand these cases with nine Justices after
granting certiorari, this is exactly what happened with eight.
The eight Justices on the Supreme Court without Justice Scalia are not
only known to split along ideological lines, but their preferences also correlate
with the political persuasions of their respective appointing Presidents.32 This
clear division perpetuates the public’s fear that the Justices will be unable to
reach consensus due to the inherent fragmentation in their voting decisions.33
This fracture and delay has also catalyzed the oftentimes publicly silent Justices
into commenting on and criticizing the Senate’s failure to hold confirmation
hearings for a ninth Justice.34
On a positive note, in an effort to reach consensus and avoid more
stalemates on the eight-member Court, the Justices were forced to find points
of unity that extended beyond their normal voting coalitions. We see this in
instances such as the shared dissents between the often opposed Justices
Sotomayor and Thomas. The two Justices dissented as many times together
during the 2015 Term (four times) as they have in all prior terms where they
sat on the Court together combined.35
Still, notwithstanding the benefits of increased collegiality, the eight–member
Supreme Court has been unable to resolve many cases that would clearly
benefit from adjudication, as detailed above, due to the Court’s even number
of Justices. A question thus arises: does the Court require nine Justices to
prevent these even divisions? By this point it should be clear that any odd
numbered amalgamation of Justices should overcome judicial stalemates.
Cases in the lower appellate courts are routinely decided by panels composed
of three judges.36 Additionally, history has shown that an odd number of
Justices will lead to decisive outcomes and will help fulfill the Court’s role as
arbiter of the law according to the Constitution.
31 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187-88 (5th Cir. 2015), aff ’d by an equally divided court,
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
32 See generally Epstein & Posner, supra note 17.
33 See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Divided Supreme Court Lurches to Term’s End, WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/divided-supreme-court-lurches-to-terms-end-1466328601 (noting that the
Court “apparently sees little purpose in taking cases for the next term that might also deadlock”).
34 See Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: 8 Is Not a Good Number,
CNN POLITICS (May 26, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/26/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburgeight-justices/ [https://perma.cc/PW5D-L2YT] (quoting Justice Ginsburg saying eight justices “is
not a good number for a multi-member court”).
35 Adam Feldman, Odd Couples (and Trios), EMPIRICAL SCOTUS (June 20, 2016),
https://empiricalscotus.com/2016/06/20/odd-couples/ [https://perma.cc/Y7T3-QXD7].
36 See 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1982) (setting the number of circuit judges on a panel at three).
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The trouble with an odd-numbered Court is that, while issues are more
easily resolved in such a setting, they may be resolved according to extra-judicial,
political factors stemming from the polarization of the Justices’ views. That
is, Justices can vote based on their political ideology, with the dominant view
at the time controlling the outcome of the case. Thus, an odd number of
Justices may create a new predicament while solving another. We are forced
to decide whether it is better to have a Court with outcomes hinging on
political motivations, or to leave the divisions in the laws unresolved and
create variation between federal geographic circuits.
III. THE SWING JUSTICE’S COURT
So what is the real impetus behind the conversation about the ensuing but
stalled confirmation hearings? It is not about the flaws in the political process
but about the ideological balance of judicial decisionmaking.
In close decisions, especially those that affect public policy, dissenting
Justices oftentimes accuse the majority of usurping power from the other
branches of government. This is apparent in Justice Breyer’s dissent in Bush v.
Gore, a case that effectively decided the outcome of a Presidential election:
However awkward or difficult it may be for Congress to resolve difficult
electoral disputes, Congress, being a political body, expresses the people’s will
far more accurately than does an unelected Court.37

It is also evident in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges, decrying
the constitutionalization of marriage equality:
This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine, always
accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the
most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won
in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.38

Justices Scalia and Breyer traditionally take positions on opposite ends of
the ideological spectrum, and yet they sound remarkably similar in their
separate accounts of a majority of the Court playing policymaker. Both of
these cases were 5–4 decisions, and both saw the more liberal Justices voting
together in one direction and the more conservative Justices voting together
in the other.39 And while the majority opinion author in Bush v. Gore is

37
38
39

531 U.S. 98, 155 (2000) (Breyer, J. dissenting).
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2627 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Although Bush v. Gore was an unsigned per curiam opinion, the dissents from the four more
liberal Justices—Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer—betray who comprised the five Justices in
the majority.
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unclear, the swing Justice of the most recent Court, Justice Kennedy, wrote
the majority opinion in Obergefell.
In fact, it is Justice Kennedy’s vote that has often dictated whether the
conservative or liberal position wins out in close cases.40 This places the power
to define the direction of Supreme Court precedent in Justice Kennedy’s hands,
especially in some of the most significant and contentious cases.41
The problem that the Court faces with nine Justices is similar to the
problem it faces with eight Justices, although the effects are different. When
Justice Scalia was still a member of the Court, four Justices tended to vote in
the liberal direction (Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) and
four tended to vote in the conservative direction (Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito). This created a vacuum of power for the swing
Justice, Justice Kennedy, to usurp, causing his vote to often be decisive.42
Justice Kennedy’s ability to shape the Court’s opinions is further
accentuated by the number of majority opinions he wrote in 5–4 cases
compared to all other Justices during this period. Majority opinion
assignment in close cases can be offered in exchange for a vote in a certain
direction.43 The figure below shows the breakdown, by opinion author, of the
183 signed 5–4 decisions from 2005–2014.

40 See Richard Wolf, From Gay Marriage to Voting Law, Kennedy Is the Key, USA TODAY (June 27, 2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/27/supreme-court-anthony-kennedy-race-votingabortion-gay-marriage/2161701/ [https://perma.cc/GBN7-GA3Y] (discussing Justice Kennedy’s pivotal
role in the outcomes of various cases). Justice O’Connor sat on the Court until the 2005 Term. When
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy sat on the Court together, Justice O’Connor shared the role of swing
Justice with Justice Kennedy. See Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States
Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1308-11 (2005) (describing Justice O’Connor as the most pivotal
Justice, along with Justice Kennedy).
41 See Eric Segall, Justice Scalia’s Cruelest Irony: This is the Real Impact of a 4–4 Supreme Court,
SALON.COM (May 26, 2016), http://www.salon.com/2016/05/28/justice_scalias_cruelest_irony_
this_is_the_real_impact_of_a_4_4_supreme_court/ [https://perma.cc/VBE4-9E3M] (noting that,
from 1988 to 2016, Justice Kennedy was in the majority of roughly 75% of the Court’s 5–4 decisions,
more than any other Justice).
42 See id. (noting Justice Kennedy’s decisive role in a number of cases).
43 Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276, 277 (2007) (“If the identity of the [majority] author does matter,
therefore, it must be because the bargaining protocol used by the Supreme Court confers a degree
of monopoly power on the opinion writer.”).
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Justice Kennedy not only wrote more of these decisions than any other
Justice, but he also wrote almost twice as many as the Justice with the next
highest count: Justice Alito. This skewed balance of opinion writing in some
of the Court’s most far–reaching constitutional decisions has deep
repercussions for how we perceive the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking
process. When the ideologically polarized Justices are split in these cases, the
locus of power is, by default, delegated to the Justice in the middle.
The real implications of the Justices’ positions in highly charged cases is
evident from those cases where Justice Kennedy’s vote defined the Court’s
majority voting direction. Take for instance the highly publicized decision in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.44 In a majority opinion
supported by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito,
Justice Kennedy harnessed the power of the First Amendment, holding:
We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech,
the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.
Both history and logic lead us to this conclusion.45

Justice Stevens, dissenting in part and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Sotomayor, discussed the gravity of this ruling, stating:

44
45

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Id. at 341.
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The Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of elected
institutions across the Nation. The path it has taken to reach its outcome will,
I fear, do damage to this institution.46

This dialogue between Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice
Stevens’ dissent illustrates the stakes involved in a case that came down to
the vote of one Justice.47
Justice Kennedy’s ability to shift the balance of the Court’s power in the
other direction is equally evident. In Boumediene v. Bush, Justice Kennedy
penned the majority opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, which allowed detainees held at Guantanamo Bay to seek the writ
of habeas corpus in federal court.48 In dissent, Justice Scalia, who supported
Justice Kennedy’s decision in Citizens United, harshly criticized the Court’s
decision as violative of the separation of powers:
What competence does the Court have to second-guess the judgment of
Congress and the President on such a point? None whatever. But the Court
blunders in nonetheless.49

These examples emphasize both Justice Kennedy’s decisionmaking power,
as well as the fact that, depending on how he voted in 5–4 decisions, he faced
harsh criticism from one ideological bloc of the Court or the other. More
importantly, however, they present the ideological divisions on the Court and
demonstrate how, from the 2005 Supreme Court Term through the 2014
Term, this placed a high-level of unilateral power in a single Justice. When
the Supreme Court’s decisions come down to one Justice rather than to nine,
the dispassionate judiciary envisioned by the Federalist Papers’ becomes
much more susceptible to scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
The main goal of this Essay is to reframe the conversation and debate
surrounding the current Supreme Court nomination stalemate. So much has
already been said about the politics involved in the unprecedented delay in
holding confirmation hearings.50 Like the Supreme Court’s current
46
47

Id. at 396 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
For additional commentary on the implications stemming from the Citizens United decision, see,
for example, Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217 (2010).
48 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008).
49 Id. at 831 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50 Compare Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History and the
Constitution Really Say About President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia,
91 NYU L. REV. ONLINE 53 (2016) (reviewing the history of Supreme Court appointments and
arguing that the Senate should not continue to delay confirmation hearings on Judge Garland), with
Ilya Shapiro, Not Giving Merrick Garland a Hearing Is the Honest Thing to Do, CATO (March 22, 2016),
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ideological divide, the current political rhetoric is ideologically divided with
conservatives generally pushing to delay confirmation hearings and liberal
Democrats generally seeking to press the Senate to hold them.51
If the driving force behind whether or not to hold confirmation hearings
is partisanship, it is detached from normative concerns. This central element
driving the confirmation debate, however, is mainly unspoken. Instead of
liberals highlighting that they hope to shift the Court back in the direction of
the Warren Court and conservatives rallying behind an attempt to keep the
ideological balance of the Court in a similar location to where it was with
Justice Scalia, the discussion largely involves the merits of expediting or
delaying confirmation hearings based on a historical understanding of the
principles that guide such calendaring decisions.
If the conversation is structured around the underlying issues involved,
then we can begin to discuss the merits of an eight versus nine-member
Court. Based on the history of the current Court, in either case, there will be
a division of opinion between the Justices on many constitutional issues. This
division splits the current Court evenly. This split quite likely led the Court
to divide evenly in several contentious cases in the 2015 Term.52
On the one hand, such results can be read as a cautionary tale. How can
an eight-member Court that splits evenly across ideological lines fulfill the
Court’s duty as arbiter of the Constitution? On the other hand, this situation
might be instructive for the Justices and seen as a story of potential. A divided
eight-member Court must learn to find common ground, as the Justices have
done in reaching many decisions. A nine-member Court does not always
reach fractured decisions, and even in cases where the Court is divided, the
dividing lines are not always as predicted.53 Perhaps an eight-member Court
would lead to a greater number of unpredicted voting patterns, with the
Justices forced to compromise to avoid deadlock.
In any event, given current statutory requirements, another Justice will
eventually be added to the Court.54 With nine Justices required to be on the
Court, the debate on when to hold confirmation hearings will inevitably
continue to hinge on ideological considerations. From a rule of law
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/not-giving-merrick-garland-hearing-honest-thing-do
[https://perma.cc/HE6F-BEXE] (arguing that little good is served by holding confirmation hearings
when the Senate would simply vote to reject Judge Garland’s nomination to the Supreme Court).
51 Shapiro, supra note 50.
52 See supra notes 26–31 and accompanying text.
53 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (involving a majority
opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Disdain Campaign, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 7-10 (2012)
(arguing that threats of public disdain moved Chief Justice Roberts from opposing the Affordable
Care Act to upholding it).
54 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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perspective, however, we can only hope that the ninth Justice, whomever that
may be, shifts the balance of power on the Court away from one Justice—as
has been the case in recent years with Justice Kennedy. While some will
disagree with the Court’s decisions, whatever they may be, removing the locus
of power from one Justice will, at the very least, enhance the group debate
and decisionmaking process that was inherent in the design of the Court as a
multimember federal institution.
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